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Comments
KELVIN VAN NUYS
I am a little fearful that the labor of “aggiornament..ing”
Quaker theology to the dynamic world-view may miscarry if
we go only as far as Teilhard, Baltazar, or John Yungblut.
Their position seems to me still a half-way house, one foot still,
if you please, in Greek, Aristotelian staticism.
My thesis begins with an acute consciousness that, in
accepting the sheer fact that all reality is dynamic, evolutionary,
“processual,” we have not yet given a reason why it is so.
We have not yet shown why divine omnipotence relates to
imperfect becoming rather than to perfect being. So far, pro
cess theology has tended to say, “Process just happens to be the
case, therefore God has to conform to it.” This is a sort of
Platonic dualism, with God opposed not by matter but by pro
cess — still facing a fact which He is not shown to have intended
or created, and why. My thesis arises from dissatisfaction with
such a limited God and from taking omnipotence seriously.
But it is a good, oninipotent God that we want; that is, one
who has been able to make reality just as it must be in order
to embody good. God, then, must be limited by only one
thing: not the sheer blank fact of process, but by value, or good.
In other words, ve must derive, deduce, our dynamic
reality from a coucel)t of value. And the only concept of value
it can be derived from is a dynamic concept of value. And
this is: value is the satisfying feeling of organizing, resolving,
creatie process, while it is happening. It must be asserted
that value cannot exist except in process; not prior to process,
as pre-existent essence, nor posterior to process as achieved
essence.
If one concedes that value is preeminently related to the
terminus of process, e.g., to an Omega point, one is inevitably
left with the question, “Why doesn’t God institute such good-
r
ness immediately, and permit such a state to exist permanently?”
If good can exist in a perfect final state, then any God who
delays that state is either impotent or non-benevolent. God-is
dead-ists accept this conclusion as unquestioiiingly as Mill,
Lucretius or Democritus. One is also tempted into glib talk
about God eventually succeeding in “final consummations,” and
then, as the millenia go by and problems keep coming, such
promises come home to roost, and the talk of Omega points
may seem sentimental at best, embittering at worst. Besides, a
nagging question has been raised: if only the remote future is
going to experience perfect good, how come it is so favored,
while we are cheated out of it? To place value in an eternal
resolving process obviates these questions.
So much for the correction as regards the relation of
dynamic fact to value. One other correction apparently must
be made, in the light of recent interpretations of evolution
and existence, on the factual side as such. The point is per
haps fully apparent in the phrase “non-preformationist crea
tivity.” Pre-existent essences, “seeds,” are being dispensed with,
so that “creativity” is coming to be opposed to any notion of
“uncovering,” “discovering,” “unrolling” of what is already
existent in any sense. Creativity cannot mean an imitation or
repetition of a predestined divine blueprint. Hartshorne sees
this age-old notion as making all present experience a pointless
reduplication of what has already been done once in God’s
mind. Creativity inherently means a new, experimental resolu
tion of a problem right here and now. The dynamic enjoy
ment of value, properly observed, can be seen to require,
besides, that the solution not be foreordained, guaranteed, but
subject to real risk and chance of failure. Tension, anxiety
could not otherwise exist, nor could good, if it is the feeling of
successfully solving tension and anxiety.
On this basis, then, I would accept much of John Yung
blut’s paper, but would be wary whenever talk of “seed,”
“potentiality,” “omega point,” etc., comes in The “seed”
metaphor can refer only to the secondary matter that creativity
does make use of some former solutions, does not always start
from scratch, builds up some retained stability out of the past.
But the total pattern of the new event is unique, not merely
20
21
1the “fulfillment” of a pre-existent plan. And if dynamic good
implies the necessity of solving real problems, then all “omega
point,” “final consummation” terminology must shift to rela
tive degrees of consummation. Insofar as Teilhard and John
Yungblut allow themselves to use such terms, they remain
Aristotelian-Thomistic in their thought. All significance is
put in prior- or post-process states, rather than in the process
itself. But if only the process really exists, as science is telling
us, we’d better get the significance into it.
Some specific examples of changes in terminology the fully
dynamic view might prefer follow:
The characterizations of creation as something still in pro
cess are right, but the phrase “tending toward an objective”
should not be interpreted as meaning a single, final objective,
but limited objectives for each epoch. The term “seed” would
not mean a hidden pre-existence of the Christ-like in man
beforehand. In full dynamism, the Christ-like would have to
be understood as creatively developed here and now through
experience, as we work it up out of poorer solutions to the
living of life. In this light, christification could not matter if
it was already present as seed. It can only matter if it builds
itself now, resolving a present need antI emergency.
It is important to recognize that the seed will not inevi
tably bear its fruit. Failure is a real possibility. This cannot
be harmonized with the traditional static conception of God’s
omnipotence. But the dynamic idea of value requires God to
permit the possibility of failure. Seriousness could not other
wise exist. If success were guaranteed, there could be no real
importance in the struggle. It would be only an idle wafting
along on the wave of mechanical success. John Yungblut is
ahead of Teilhard in accepting this and rejecting the Aristo
telian certainty that the seed will produce its final fruit.
I agree with John Yungblut’s rejection of “return of
Christ.” All “re-’ words are inadequate to creativity: redemp
tion, renewal, revival, etc. Creativity is not going backwards
to any former state, nor merely repeating former events.
‘What we have to be is what we are by promise.” This is
straight Aristotelian “We must become what we are,” and is
just as self-contradictory as it looks. Existentialism is correct
22
here: existence precedes essence. We create ourselves (or are
created) as we experimentally live in the time process.
“Creation is still going on and the essential meaning of
reality will be revealed only at the end of the process.” This is
a terrible thought, which reveals the perniciousness of the half
way house type of dynamism. No such wait before one knows
for sure about divine meaningfulness is involved at all. That
would mean we could never be sure. Meaning is experience-
able within process by anyone right now. It is the prevalence
of the sort of belief here (Utopianism) that is killing God in
the twentieth century.
In summary, I have sought to show how one must go
ftirtlier than Teilhard or John Yungblut, if one means to take
omnipotence seriously in a dynamic world.
T. VAIL PALMER, JR.
John Yungblut’s thesis seems to be, in broadest terms, that
the thought of Teilhard de Chardin can be drawn upon for a
major updating of Quaker theology. In order to establish this
thesis, he has to show: first, the genuine insights to be found in
Teilhard’s writings; second, the points in historical or con
temporary Quaker thought which are ripe to be updated; and
third, the relationship between the two. I am convinced that
John Yungblut has failed to demonstrate an understanding of
either historical or contemporary Quaker thought, and has
therefore provided no meaningful route through which Teil
hard’s thought can be related to Quakerism.
He refers to “our Christology and our understanding of
‘that of God in every man’” as the key points in Quaker thought
which need updating. He develops this point by referring to
“the Light Within, . . . the Light of Christ, . . . and the Seed”
as some Quaker phrases equivalent to “that of God.” The use
of this terminology makes it clear that he must be writing
within the context of the Quaker thought which derives its
inspiration from Rufus M. Jones. Most Friends within this
23
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and liberal in their views. No other group of contemporary
Quaker thinkers would accept these terms as being equivalent.
And if the most recent generation of Quaker historical scholar
ship has accomplished anything, it is the proof that these terms
were not equivalent in the thought of George Fox and the
early Quakers.
John Yungblut refers to the “pre-Darwinian connotation”
of “the metaphor, ‘the seed’.” This reference is completely
puzzling, if not misleading. He implies that, even before Dar
win, “the seed” was a botanical metaphor in Quaker thought.
But in the thought of the early Friends “the seed” was not a
botanical metaphor. Fox used the term to describe Christ as
“the seed of the woman that bruises the serpent’s head” (an
obvious reference to Genesis 3:15) and “the seed of Abraham”
(as in Galatians 3:16). Fox and the King James Bible were
simply using “seed” in the sense of “offspring” or “descend
ant (s)” — a meaning of the word which has since largely
dropped out of the English language. The reinterpretation of
“the seed” into a botanical metaphor was primarily the work
of Rufus Jones and his generation of Friends — hardly a pre
Darwinian development!
And, indeed, if John Yungblut is writing primarily for the
followers of Rufus Jones, how can he say that “our Christology
and our understanding of ‘that of God in every man’ have not
yet adequately begun to follow” the curve of evolution? It is
impossible to take seriously the suggestion that Rufus Jones, for
instance, ignores the idea of evolution in his religious thought;
the final chapter of his The Faith and Practice of the Quakers
should be ample evidence to the contrary! How, too, can he
suggest that his proposed updating will make one “become
attentive to the immanent God”? Rufus Jones has long since
insisted on the immanence of God within the soul,
Perhaps, then, John Yungblut did intend to make early
Quakerism, and/or the views of those “reconstructionist Quaker
scholars” (as R. W. Tucker calls them) who wish to recapture
the religious vision of George Fox, his “jumping-off” point. If
so, I have already suggested that he has gone far astray by
equating “that of God” with the Inward Light and the Christ
Within, and by construing the Seed as a botanical metaphor.
To be able today to write of “the doctrine that there is that of
God in every man” as part of Fox’s thought or to affirm that
for Fox such a doctrine “does.., presuppose the immanence of
the supernatural in the form of grace” is simply to display one’s
ignorance of the past forty years of scholarly study of Quaker
origins. Moreover, John Yungblut demonstrates his complete
failure to understand Fox when he says that Fox’s “philosophic
undergirding... was not fundamentally different from the
Aristotelian-Thomistic one,” He does demonstrate his aware
ness of the deep distinction between Augustinian and Thom
istic thought. He should therefore have been able to recognize
that Fox’s theological presuppositions, like those of Luther and
Calvin, were clearly Augustinian. In the Augustinian frame
work, such concepts as the “bridging” of the world of nature
(creation) and the supernatural world are simply irrelevant.
In short, John Yungblut demands an updating “of our
only Quaker dogma.” He does not define that dogma in the
immediate context. However, I have heard some Friends say
that “belief in that of God in every man is our only Quaker
dogma,” and this interpretation would make sense in the larger
context of the paper. The only Friends who raise this belief
to the status of dogma are those of the liberal-mystical variety.
John Yungblut, however, has not really proposed a radical
updating of liberal-mystical Quaker thought, but only a work
ing out of some strands already strongly present in Rufus
Jones’ thought. If he is trying to update other types of Quaker
thought — evangelical or reconstructionist — he will have to
recognize that most such Friends do not even “believe in” That
of God in Every Man, much less accept the idea as a dogma.
He has therefore failed even to establish a point of contact with
these Friends. Until he can demonstrate that he is not simply
confused about the nature of Quaker thought, past or present,
he certainly will be unable to establish the thesis that the
thought of Teilhard de Chardin is relevant to Quaker theology.
The more the pity, since a theologian of Teilhard’s stature may
well have a great deal to offer in the way of enriching the
thought of even the most orthodox of evangelical or recon
structionist Friends.
school of thought would unhesitatingly call themselves mystical
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HUGH S. BARBOUR
The spark of joy in God’s creation which John Yungblut
has shared with us in his vision of “the christification of man”
centers above all on his sense of the wonder at the creativity
within men. He shows the depths of mysticism and symbolism,
of dream experience and human love that are part of each of
us. Granted that “divinization of man,” to the point where
“that of God in every man” becomes “our only Quaker dogma,”
are phrases to enrage an evangelical. Granted that to the lib
eral Protestant the alliance of evolution and Christian faith has
not been news since Henry Drummond in the 1890’s. Never
theless, we all — and not just the Catholics — find our heart
beats speeding at the renewed hope that science, theology, and
human history may once again be seen as one whole focussing
on Christ. Since simple progress-ideas faded, we have hungered
for a theology of history more affirmative than Barth’s.
Yet we may need to push several steps further in the direc
tion Teilhard and John Yungblut meant to go. They talk
about evolution as having “progressed by means of expanding
forms of consciousness,” not just of biology; so that through the
human mind — and the inherent possibilities for its emergence
even in lower forms of life — the earth itself can be called the
“noosphere.” In Teilhard’s Phenomenon of Man this makes
mind a new mechanism of evolution, by which (just as in the
Marxist theory of class struggle as the mechanism of history)
men’s awareness of events shapes events. This is what Teilhard
means by man’s capacity for “reflection.” Thought becomes a
“feedback mechanism” within the process, for guiding the pro
cess, like a thermostat. Unfortunately, Teilhard may confuse
the issue in trying to identify reflection with a much more uni
versal kind of “withinness” which he senses mystically, by which
creatures at all levels unfold their potentiality. Can we say
more about what reflection means without falling back on
inner feeling?
Teilbard ties evolution up with reflection but also with
“complexification,” the increasingly high-order (as well as more
inclusive) interactions of the atoms, molecules, cells, nerve
chains and limbs as one goes up the ladder of living creatures.
This might have led him to ask more sharply what goes on in
human awareness and self-consciousness.
What higher animals show is a special kind of response by
reflection, awareness of their own action as a whole, for
instance when a dog expects to be praised or blamed for what
he has done, or a fox seems able to imagine what he might do
to cover his tracks by running down a stream. A monkey gets
more excited when he “sees” the answer to a problem, than
even when he acts out the solution and gets the reward. We
can call this insight, or awareness. It is the visible sign that
seems to be linked to consciousness within. Men seem to be
able to go a step farther, and imagine not only what they could
do but what they could be. We are self-aware and self-conscious;
and while I doubt if we can draw as sharp a line as Teilhard
does between Adam’s self-consciousness and the mere awareness
of animals, human self-awareness is more than “linear feed
back” by which we can correct the course of our evolution.
Self-awareness means self-transcendence, and not just in
the sense of transcending the level of animal awareness. We,
as
it were, jump out of the boat of our lives and see it sail by
“from outside”; but where is this “outside” to be located? W
e
lack any perch from which to look back as we transcend
ourselves. Thus (as Tillich says) self-consciousness means
embarrassment and a sense of isolation. Clearly identification
with a social group and its ideals, or with a personal ide
al
such as christification, may give us such an anchorage for
self-
transcendence. In practice, certainly, we achieve more objec
tivity when we learn to “see ourselves as others see us,”
or
measure ourselves by “the stature of the fullness of Christ.”
Yet to identify ourselves with a larger group, though it
may quiet our self-doubts, is no guarantee of higher res
ponse
or of higher manhood, as the Nazis demonstrated. Self-awa
reness
in the form of self-judgment was as fully lost by the Nazis’
immersion in German “blood and soil” as nowadays American
s
can lose self-transcendence in alcohol or drugs which only
seem
to produce wider experience beyond the self. John Yu
ngblut’s
clue-in-passing is his own desire to communicate (by words like
divinization) with the humanists. He sees our need for a
dialogue of experiences. If christification is our goal, d
o we
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really know how a community of Christs would speak to each
other, how they would live together? Paul (in I Cor. 12) calls
us all limbs or members of one body, but how does a hand
speak to a foot? In fact, we speak to each other as self-aware
individuals.
Our self-transcendence as men, then, has to be related to
our ability to share experience with other men: for this, both
their sameness and their otherness to ourselves are vital. To
recognize the strangeness of someone else’s experience calls for
imagination, for a certain partial ability to share in it. That
we can partly so share in what is strange to us makes real our
objectivity, our self-transcendence, as even die sharing of iden
tical experiences could not do. To share demands sympathy,
trust, love in the concrete (as against general, diffuse benevo
lence and sense of unity in all life). It requires and produces
humility. Thus in place of Teilhard’s vision of the convergence
of all men upon one “Point Omega” which is Christ, I have to
posit a Kingdom of God in which we will always remain dis
tinct, limited, and different. It is God himself beneath and
beyond us, and not the identity of divinity within us, which is
“the ground of our dialogue.”
In various ways, sensitive doctrines of sin have seen human
evil as man’s self-ceiiteredness, his inability to transcend him
self (to paraphrase Augustine), his inability to respond to God
or men. In the Middle Ages pride was called the ultimate of
deadly sins. Teilhard de Chardin knew the depth of suffering,
both in the first World War and in Chinese floods and epi
demics. Without solving the problem of evil, he saw it as
a step to greater wholeness, so that “tout cc qui arrive est
adorable” (“everything that happens is worthy of praise”). A
saint himself, he was selfless in relation to God and his Jesuit
Order. He was presumably no stranger to either the good or
the sinful within himself. Yet he was accused his life long of
not recognizing the power of sin, and identifying (like Bal
tazar) creation with redemption. His weak spot was perhaps
his inability to recognize man’s radical fear of self-transcendence
(as Nicbuhr for one spells it out), and thus man’s rebellion
against dialogue. (Teilhard himself, in all his years in China,
never learned Chinese, nor Chinese psychology.) As Luther
said, when man sees the divine in his own christified image,
not in the strangeness of life with others, he thereby becomes
an idolator.
This goes much deeper than the contrast of an immanent
versus a transcendent role for God, or even than the difference
between a static substance-philosophy and a modern process
philosophy. Baltazar, for example, by assuming that man’s
goal is given from the beginning, seems to be urging an Aristo—
telian telic world-view, not a truly dynamic and open one in
the spirit of Whitehead. Teilhard does the same, as is shown,
for instance, by his assumption that Point Omega also repre
sents a highly unified and collective human society, rigorously
uniform. Real grace, which God gives gratuitously and mdi
vidually, plays no role here. God’s freedom as well as man’s
are much circumscribed, when christification of the universe
becomes merely the fullness of creation.
Here John Yungblut does break free, and sees that “love
is an interpersonal union, and hence operates within the unique
ness of individual, the personal.” I think that one can only
do justice to his concern for the divine within us out of such a
perspective. George Fox’s “ocean of darkness and ocean of
light” are within us (look up the passage), and are only sec
ondarily cosmic. Whether they reflect a static or dynamic cos
mology is irrelevant since they are dynamic powers in Fox’s
life and in history. The darkness represents within Fox and
us “the natures of dogs, swine, vipers, of Sodom and Egypt,
Pharaoh, Cain, etc.; the natures of these I saw within, though
people had been looking without.” And at once Fox sees that
at least his self-awareness on these dark matters is related to his
ability to “speak to all conditions” of other men, and to “sense
their conditions.” We must add that the inner ocean of dark
ness is the root of our inability to transcend ourselves toward
other men and God, and that the inner ocean of light is also
only real if it genuinely carries us beyond ourselves to the
strangeness of shared personal understanding. The divine works
through us as the ground of our daily dialogue, not simply as
“mystical consciousness of identification with all men, all
nature, and with nature’s god.” In relation to God, we may




in hand with ability to listen to a word from beyond. Thus, as
Auden says it, the ground of our dialogue becomes also “the
ground of our beseeching.”
CHRIS DOWNING
I am grateful to John Yungblut for his insistence that in
this time of broken-ness we must look forward to a vision of a
future reconciliation, even though for me Teilhard’s vision
does not have the power that it has for him. It may be that
we do not so much choose our symbols as find ourselves chosen
by them, and I have not yet been so claimed by any vision. I
am perhaps more likely to look for one from a poet than a
theologian or philosopher, but this is mostly because I share
with John Yungblut a sadness about what theology and philos
ophy have in our time mostly become. And even the poetry
that speaks with power to me is still mostly the poetry that
issues from a wrestling with the present broken-ness — that can
move beyond that only so far as to bring that broken-ness itself
to poem, to form. My own speaking, too, is one that knows
more of the present confusions than of a future resolution
but John Yungblut is right that in this time we need a seer.
Perhaps part of the reason why for me Teilhard does not
serve as that seer is that I miss in him a sense of his having
gone through this present which lies between any new recon
ciliation and the optimisms of Darwin’s century. We are all
post-Darwinians but post- so much else besides — I think
especially of Nietzsche and Freud and Auschwitz and Hiro
shima. I am struck by the fact that for John Yungblut evolu
tion is the revolutionary discovery, biological space-time the
perspective. Evolution in Darwin’s sense means so much less
to me — the survival of those who survive. (The “fittest” has
no other sense in his system.) As in Hegel’s philosophy of his
tory, that which succeeds is by definition that which is worthy.
In itself evolution gives us no criteria for determining which
future, which potentialities, to commit ourselves to. For me
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the Nietzschean revolution is the more radical one. To recog
nize the world as our symbol-work is to see even evolution as
J a perspective we choose to adopt, to see it, too, as a metaphor.To posit a static world as the Greeks perhaps did, or a cyclic
one as the Egyptians and Indians did, or an ever-rebalancing
one as the Chinese do, or an evolving one as we in the West
have done — is not so much to say what is “really” so, but what
we choose to emphasize, what we see as valuable, meaningful
—
these are each interpretations of the world. And each, as I
see it, both enriches and impoverishes. For instance, to put
the locus of meaning at the end, always beyond, is unbearable
—
so unbearable that it almost demands to be balanced by
mysticism’s affirmation of the presence of the meaningful. And
think of how nirvana eventually arose as a way of escaping
from the endless cycle of karma, though that had originally
been a way of escaping from the meaninglessness of finitude.
I don’t find that the symbol language of science, physics
or biology, has any more authority than any other. We have
to ask what human purpose it serves. Today’s students tend to
reject this particular mode of word because it has been used so
often for dehumanizing purposes, and so they are suspicious of
any new reconciliation which suggests subservience to science
or the languagr of science. Yet I appreciate that Teilhard
sought to bridge the gap between science and poetry, the gap
between nature and history so insisted upon by neo-orthodoxy,
and I agree to the need for such bridging. Teilhard is right
that nature as well as man is to be redeemed, and I understand
this to call for a different relation of man to nature, replacing
the objectifying relationship of science with an erotic one. But
Teilhard’s word for this, christogenesis, doesn’t speak to me; I
find myself, no matter how much I try to overcome it, turned
off by these word-coinages which remain for me clumsy and
unpoetic, without metaphoric power.
And, of course, the difficulty with trying to formulate a
theology on the basis of a symbolics borrowed from evolution
is that it doesn’t really help much toward overcoming the
apparent dichotomy between nature and history. The differ
cnces between the logics of cause-language and purpose-language
have to b explored and hopefully transcended, not simply
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1ignored. It has to be recognized how difficult it is to fit things
like freedom and responsibility and surprise into a nature-
oriented schema. John Yungblut seems aware of the difficulties
of trying to take over the language of evolution to call for a
moral revolution; there is an audible difference between his
insistence that there is “no guarantee” and Teilhard’s convic
tion of the certainty of christification. Either it’s necessary,
inevitable, determined, or it isn’t; either it really depends on
man or it doesn’t.
So far I have ben speaking of different intepretations of
the world, and of what I find important and what unsatisfying
in Teilhard’s intepretation. But Marx told us that it was time
now to go beyond interpretation, time to change the world.
Part of what disappoints me in Teilhard, and in Jung, is the
onesidedness of their focus on transforming consciousness — and
then the jump to the cosmic perspective, with so little account
of tomorrow, earth, deed, history. What is called for must
surely be not only a transformation of consciousness but also of
practice and world. The adoption of the biological space-time
perspective seems to imply a cosmological time-scale which over-
leaps human time, historical time, political time, time with
husband and brother and children. And I think here of how
Jesus rcfused to paint a picture of what the Kingdom of God
would be like or of how and when it might come, but spoke
instead of what commitment to its coming damanded of us now.
This involves also John Yungblut’s emphasis on the inter
ior, on solitude, on within-ness. Not that I would want to
deny the importance of these but that I feel there has to be
more than this, there must also be a plea for more with-ness.
Doesn’t a new consciousness mean a new con-sciousness, a new
knowing-with? One can’t choose Buber or Jung — not if one
is trying to point forward to a reconciling vision — not if one




It is a sobering if not altogether salutary experience for
one to be told by his colleagues that he is barking up the wrong
tree in the wrong key and (heaven help him!) in hot pursuit
of the wrong prey. This is the message I infer from the responses
made to my paper, ranging as they do from one which would
break the news as tenderly as possible to one which seems bent
on total demolition. Mustering as much courage as I can for
what feels a little too much like an exercise in futility, I will
speak individually to my respondents.
Chris Downing allows that I am after the right game (look
ing forward to a vision of future reconciliation) but am fore
ordained to failure because I’m searching in the wrong place
at the wrong time. I find myself in agreement with a number
of things she says. She is inclined to expect that if a vision
should come it would come from a poet rather than a theolo
gian or a philosopher, and she is repelled by the singularly
unpoetic ring of some of Teilhard’s coined words. I would
concede both points. On the other hand, I am sure I could
find considerable support for the contention that Teilhard is
far more poet than theologian or philosopher, despite some of
his offending words. When I ventured to mention to a Jesuit
priest the suggestion many have made that Teilhard may be a
modern Aquinas for the Roman Church, he made the very
discerning reply that it is more likely that Teilhard will play
Abelard to some future Aquinas. In any case, it is precisely
the poet in Teilhard that appeals to me.
The evolutionary perspective is not the only one for our
time,
of course. It is however an inescapable one, affecting all
oth rs, including the Freudian and the Nietzschean, in a way
that they cannot be said to affect it. Moreover, evolutionary
process is not a theory or a metaphor, but a fact, though meta
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